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RECENT CASES

I

STATUTE OF FRAUDS-PENNSYLVANIA LANDLORD
AND TENANT ACT OF 1951-LEASES FOR MORE
THAN THREE YEARS MUST BE SIGNED BY
BOTH THE LESSOR AND THE LESSEE
Burg v. Betty Gay of Washington, Inc., 423 Pa. 485,
225 A.2d 85 (1966)
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Burg v. Betty Gay of
Washington, Inc.' has held that a lessee who has validly signed a
twenty-one year lease may raise the defense of the Statute of
Frauds 2 against a lessor who failed to properly sign the lease which
he is seeking to enforce.
A written twenty-one year lease agreement dated December 21,
1961 was signed by the president of Betty Gay of Washington, Inc.,
the tenant, and by an agent representing the lessor Burg. Burg's
agent, however, did not have written authority to sign the lease.
The lease provided that Burg would submit plans for a storeroom,
to be constructed on the premises by him, to the lessee within
thirty days and acquire the land to be leased within sixty days after
the lease was executed. The entire premises were to be ready for
occupancy by May 15, 1962. The lessor's duties under the agreed
completion schedule were to be conditions precedent to the lease
becoming effective, and the lessee was given an express right to
terminate the lease if the premises were not ready for occupancy
on May 15, 1962.
The lessee never affirmed the submitted plans and Burg failed
to acquire title to the land within the required sixty days. The
parties did, however, orally agree that:
[T] he completion date of May 15, 1962, provided for in paragraph 6 of the lease, should be extended indefinitely and
thereafter determined by mutual agreement of plaintiff
and defendant as and when final detailed plans and specifications for the building provided for by the lease were submitted by plaintiff and approved by defendant.8
1. 423 Pa. 485, 225 A.2d 85 (1966).
. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.202 (1951):
Real property . . . may be leased for a term of more than three
years by a landlord to a tenant or by their respective agents lawfully authorized in writing. Any such lease must be in writing and
signed by the parties making or creating the same, otherwise it
shall have the force and effect of a lease at will only ....
3. 46 Wash. 163, 168 (1966) (Emphasis in original.)
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The original completion date passed without Burg either purchasing the land or erecting the storeroom. On June 26, 1962 Betty Gay
gave notice to Burg that it was terminating the lease due to Burg's
non-compliance with conditions precedent.
In the plaintiff's suit in assumpsit for breach of lease, the
trial court, without considering the Statute of Frauds, held that
the lessee had a right to terminate the lease:
Where parties extend the time for performance, to be determined by mutual agreement of the parties, the agreement becomes indefinite as to time and either party can
terminate after reasonable notice, in the absence of prejudice to the other party4 (as, if he had purchased the land
and obtained rezoning.)
On appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court, but on the theory that the Statute of Frauds requires leases
of realty for terms greater than three years to be in writing and
signed by the parties creating
the lease or by their agents, having
5
written authority to act.

There was ample evidence presented to find for the defendant
on breach of conditions precedent, or on the contractual theory
adopted by the lower court. 6 The supreme court, however, by allowing the statute of Frauds to be used as a defense by one who
had signed the lease, has taken a firm stand in an area of the law
which has been notorious for confusion and contradiction.
The confusion pervading the Statute of Frauds for leases of
more than three years is caused by two different interpretations
given to the Pennsylvania Statute of Frauds of 1772:7 (1) that
only the party creating the estate need sign; 8 or (2) that only the
party sought to be charged need sign 9 the lease in order for the
Statute of Frauds requirements to be satisfied. Until Burg, however, no court has held that both the lessor and the lessee must
4. Id. at 169.
5. 423 Pa. 485, 225 A.2d 85 (1966); see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.202
(1951).
6. See Guilford Development Corp. v. McCrory Corp., 23 A.D.2d 751,
259 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1965) (a comparable fact situation decided on a contract
analysis).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1 (1949):
From and after April 10, 1772, all leases ... not put in writing
and signed by the parties so making or creating the same, or their
agents, thereunto lawfully authorized by writing, shall have the
force and effect of leases at will only . . . and moreover, that no
leases . . . shall . . . be assigned, granted or surrendered, unless it
be by deed or note, in writing, signed by the party so assigning,
granting or surrendering the same, or their agents, thereunto lawfully authorized by writing. ...
8. Flomar Corp. v. Logue, 418 Pa. 181, 210 A.2d 254 (1965); Brady
Land Co. v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 410 Pa. 636, 190 A.2d 568 (1963); Axe v.
Potts, 349 Pa. 339 (1944); Stevenson v. Titus, 332 Pa. 100, 2 A.2d 853 (1939);
Everhart v. Dolph, 133 Pa. 628, 19 At. 431 (1890).
9. Schultz v. Burlock, 6 Pa. Super. 573 (1898). But see Tuttlemen
v. Beetem, 48 Pa. Super. 345 (1911) (distinguishing Schultz).
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sign the lease. 10 The statute also required that an agent signing
the lease must have written authority" or a subsequent act of
ratification from his principal prior to any repudiation by the other
12

party.
The 1772 Statute of Frauds, and the 1951 Landlord and Tenant
Act which repealed it in so far as it related to leases, 13 are worded
very similarly. The 1951 Act, however, separates the old act into
three sections which are titled: "Leases for not more than three
years;' 4 "Leases for more than three years;' 5 and "Assignment,
grant and surrender of leases to be in writing; exception." 6
Section 250.201 has been uniformly interpreted and clearly does
not require any writing for a lease of realty for a term less than
three years. The legislature enacted section 250.202 to govern the
creation of leases for terms greater than three years by requiring
(a) the leases to be in writing, (b) signed "by the parties making
or creating the same," or (c) if signed by an agent, that he have
written authority from his principal." Section 250.203, enacted as
an exception to section 250.202, applies to the transfer of an existing
lease. It requires only a "writing signed by the party assigning,
granting or surrendering the same or his agent"' 8 to satisfy the
requirements of the statute. The subtitle, "exception," did not
appear in the Act of 1772. It might be inferred from its inclusion in
the 1951 Act, that the legislature intended to distinguish transfer
of existing leases, which must be signed only by the transferor,
10. 56 DICK. L. REV. 431, 433 (1952).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.202 (1951).
12. For a thorough discussion of ratification see: Marqusee v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 198 Fed. 475 (3d Cir. 1912), cert. denied 229 U.S. 621
(1912); Berbeich v. Berbeich, 383 Pa. 349, 118 A.2d 445 (1955); Allegheny
Gas Co. v. Kemp, 316 Pa. 97, 174 Atl. 289 (1934); Willis-Winchester Co. v.
Clay, 293 Pa. 513, 143 Atl. 227 (1928); McClintock v. South Penn Oil Co.,

146 Pa. 144, 23 Atl. 211 (1892); Jennings v. McComb, 112 Pa. 518, 4 Atl. 812
(1886); Twitchell v. City of Philadelphia, 33 Pa. 212 (1859); Rosenblum v.
New York Central R.R., 162 Pa. Super. 276, 57 A.2d 690 (1948). See generally, TRICKETT, LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT IN PENNSYLVANIA § 23 (Stern
3d ed. 1961); 3 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §§ 1080, 1098, 1099 (1959 replacement); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 88 (1958); Mechem, The Rationale of Ratification, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 649-75 (1952) (an excellent article by
Professor Mechem pointed out the distinctions between the English, Wisconsin, and prevailing majority view on the effect of ratification); 38 MARQ.
L. REV. 203 (1955).

13. Pennsylvania is the only state in the United States which has
never adopted any portion of the English Statute of Frauds for the sale of
real estate. The courts have generally treated the issues involving sales
of real estate under the same 1772 Statute of Frauds enacted for leases of
real estate. See 55 Dicx. L. REV. 96, 97 (1950).
14.

15.
16.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.201 (1951).

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.202 (1951).

PA. STAT.
PA. STAT.
18. PA. STAT.
Mar Corp., 362 Pa.

17.

ANN. tit. 68, § 250.203 (1951).
ANN. tit. 68, § 250.202 (1951).
ANN. tit. 68, § 250.203 (1951);
35, 85 A.2d 21 (1952).

(Emphasis added.)
see also Nigro v. Don-
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from the creation of new leases, requiring signature of both lessor
and lessee. This inference has not as yet been drawn by the
courts.
Three recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions have interpreted section 250.202 of the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951.19
The cases have differing fact situations, and no one of them holds
that both the lessor and the lessee, or their lawfully authorized
agents, must sign the lease for a term greater than three years.
Taken, together, however, this interpretation is substantiated.
In Brady Land Co. v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa.2" the defendant lessee's agent negotiated with and submitted to the lessor a ten year
lease proposal which the lessor signed and returned. Neither the
lessee nor his agent ever signed the lease. The lessor's suit to enforce the lease was denied by the supreme court, holding the lease
the lease for the lessee
unenforceable because the agent negotiating
21
was not so authorized in writing.
Flomar Corp. v. Logue22 did not raise the issue of an agent's
authorization to act. A four year lease was negotiated by the lessor
and lessee and signed by the lessee only. The supreme court
denied 2 3the lessor's suit to enforce the lease because he had not
signed.

19. Brady Land Co. v. Bell Tel. Co., 410 Pa. 636, 190 A.2d 568 (1963);
Flomar Corp. v. Logue, 418 Pa. 181, 210 A.2d 254 (1965); Burg v. Betty
Gay of Washington, Inc., 423 Pa. 485, 225 A.2d 85 (1966).
20. 410 Pa. 636, 190 A.2d 568 (1963).
21. Id. at 638, 190 A.2d at 568 (1963): "[N]o lease existed because
there was no evidence that the defendant's agent was authorized in writing
to enter into a lease." But see the Brady lower court, which reasoned that
the lease would have been enforceable because the lessor had signed, but
held that it was not enforceable because the lessee's agent had no written
authority:
It is well settled in Pennsylvania that an instrument making or
creating an interest or estate in land, whether by deed or lease, for
a term in excess of three years, need only be signed by the parties
creating the interest and need not be signed by the parties receiving the interest. It is therefore only the lessor or grantor who is
required to sign the agreement.
108 P.L.J. 117, 118 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
22. 418 Pa. 181, 210 A.2d 254 (1965). This case was decided during
the pendency of the Burg action and thus was not cited by either party
or the court. The Flomar court said:
It is indeed strange that such a turn of events should arise since the
one seeking to enforce the lease is the delinquent party. Why the
lease was not signed on behalf of the lessor is undisclosed, but the
fact remains that it was not done. Therefore, the effect of the
statute above set forth is to make the tenancy here involved one
at will. ...
418 Pa. at 183, 210 A.2d at 255.
The decision is not clearly
23. Id. at 181, 210 A.2d at 254 (1965).
based on whether the lessor has not signed or whether both parties have
not signed. The Pennsylvania reporter in the syllabus interprets the decision as rendering the lease unenforceable because it was not signed by the
lessor.
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Burg v. Betty Gay of Washington, Inc.24 involved a combination of the Brady and Flomer issues. A twenty-one year lease was
signed by the lessee and the lessor's agent acting without written
authority. The supreme court, relying on Brady held the lease unenforceable because the agent
of the lessor was not authorized in
25
writing to bind his principal.

Superficially, the rule to be taken from Brady and Burg applies only to the authority of an agent: if an agent signs a lease,
and is acting for either party without written authority to bind his
principal, the lease contract is unenforceable by either lessor or
lessee and a tenancy at will exists. It may be argued that Flomar
holds that only the lessor, or his lawfully authorized agent, need
sign for the lease to be enforceable.
It is asserted, however, that the predominant rule to be taken
from these three cases is: in order for a lease created for a term
greater than three years to be enforceable, both the lessor and the
lessee, or their lawfully authorized agents must sign. The basis of
the Burg decision is mutuality of obligation. The supreme court
reasoned that if the lessee would be held to be bound to his signature, while the lessor, acting through an unauthorized agent,
would be able to ratify and enforce the lease, or repudiate it at his
leisure, "the defense of the statute of frauds will be available only
to the lessor, which result would be totally inconsistent with the
requirement of mutuality of obligation of contracts and with the
settled policy that either party may raise the statute of frauds.12 6
Thus, as the Burg court interprets the Statute of Frauds, neither
party to the lease is bound until both parties are bound. If it is
assumed that requiring an agent to have written authority is necessary to validate his signature as substitute for the signature of his
principal, then the requirement that the agent must have written
authority is the same as requiring the signature of the principal he
represents. Thus the Burg court, by not enforcing the lease because the agent who signed for the lessor was not authorized in
writing, is rendering the lease unenforceable because only one
party, the lessee, has validly signed. A lease not signed by one
party is unenforceable because it is not binding on both parties,
hence offending the principal of mutuality of obligation of contracts.
This interpretation would not have changed the result of
Brady where the lessor had signed the lease and neither the lessee
nor his agent signed. The Floinarholding also becomes an instance
where the lease, signed by only the lessee, is unenforceable because
not signed by both parties.
24.
25.
26.
Pa. 184,

423 Pa. 485, 255 A.2d 85 (1966).
Ibid.
Id. at 487, 225 A.2d at 86 (1966), citing Haskell v. Heathcote, 363
69 A.2d 71 (1949).
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A question may arise as to whether mutuality of obligation is
the proper or best foundation for applying the Statute of Frauds.
Professor Corbin vigorously attacks the concept as being merely
27
another facet of the more basic consideration requirement.
28
Though his liberal thinking is not widely followed, mutuality of
obligation is generally not required by a Statute of Frauds in
which the signatures of both the lessor and the lessee are not required. In New York for example, the Statute of Frauds requires
only the party sought to be charged to sign a lease for more than
one year. 29 Thus, if the party sought to be charged has signed
the lease himself or by his lawfully authorized agent, it becomes
immaterial whether the party bringing the suit has signed or whether his agent has written authority. This interpretation is applied
in Pennsylvania under the Uniform Commercial Code for the sale
of goods priced at more than five hundred dollars. 30 Neither the
legislature nor the courts have explained the lack of uniformity
between Statutes of Frauds for leases and sale of goods. The 1951
Landlord and Tenant Act requires signature of "the parties making
or creating the same ... ."31 The Burg court applies the contract
principle of mutuality of obligation to the operation of the statute.
Thus, both the lessor and lessee, or their lawfully authorized
agents, must sign a lease for more than three years, to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds.
GERALD K. MomusoN

27.

1 A. CoPBiN, CONTRACTS § 152 (1963).

28. But see Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin, 1 F.2d 687 (3d Cir.
1924) (following the Corbin view).
29.

NEW YORK REAL PROPERTY LAW,

§ 259:

A contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year is void
unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in writing, subscribed by the party to be
charged or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
See Fiorito v. Yaskulski, 16 A.D.2d 867, 228 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1962); Id.at 600,
16 A.D.2d at 868 (citing NEW YORK REAL PROPERTY LAW, § 259).
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-201 (1953).
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.202 (1951).

ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION-OPERATIVE LOCUS OF
TORT IN A NON-MARITIME STATUS
PERSONAL INJURY SUIT
Thomson v. Chesapeake Yacht Club, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 555 (D.
Md. 1965)
Thomson, whose boat was moored at respondent's pier, fell into
navigable water through a hole in the pier when he went onto the
pier to secure the vessel's mooring lines. Thomson sued in admiralty, alleging that as a result of the fall and immersion in the cold
water he sustained permanent injuries; but he claimed that he received no injury or damage until he struck the water. The federal district court in Thomson v. Chesapeake Yacht Club, Inc.'
exception to admiralty jurisdiction of the
sustained respondent's
2
negligence claim.
Admiralty jurisdiction is an amorphous concept. Although the
federal constitution declares the judicial power of the United States
shall extend to "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction
..."3 and this power is reiterated in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333, there, is
no statutory definition of the jurisdiction's extent.4 Case law
serves as the only guide to enlightenment. Admiralty jurisdiction
has long been said to comprehend all maritime contracts, torts, and
injuries. 5 The law is now well settled: in matters of contract,
jurisdiction depends upon the nature of the contract, whether the
contract has reference to maritime service or maritime transaction.6 In matters of tort, admiralty jurisdiction is exclusively dependent upon the locality of the act.7 If a tort occurs on or in
navigable water 8 maritime law applies; if the tort occurs on land
maritime law does not apply. It is also clear that structures such
as docks, piers, and wharves which project over navigable water
are extensions of land.9 Therefore, a tort committed on a dock is
1. 255 F. Supp. 555 (D. Md. 1965).
2. Id. at 559. In a supplemental opinion, the court upheld libellant's
amended complaint alleging injury as a result of breach of the respondentwharfinger's contract to provide a safe pier. The alleged contract was held
to be for maritime service and so within admiralty jurisdiction.
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
4. The Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361 (1904); North Pacific S.S. Co. v. Hall
Bros. Co., 249 U.S. 119 (1919); Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1 (1870).
5. 2 Gall 398 (D.C. D. Mass. 1815).
6. North Pacific S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Co., 249 U.S. 119 (1919).
7. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
8. Navigable waters were expanded beyond the ebb and flow of the
tide to include lakes and their connecting waters in The Propeller Genesee
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443 (1851).
9. Ex Parte Easton, 95 U.S. 68 (1877); Hastings v. Mann, 340 F.2d 910
(4th Cir. 1965); American Export Lines, Inc. v. Revel, 266 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.
1959).
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not within admiralty jurisdiction. Had libellant Thomson incurred
some injury on the pier during his fall to the water below, admiralty jurisdiction would not intervene. Thomson focuses squarely on the fact that the libellant suffered no injury until he struck
the water.
If negligence originates in one place and damage is sustained
in another, some rule is necessary in order to determine the locus
of the tort. This problem was first discussed in the 1865 case of
The Plymouth. 0 Respondent's vessel was anchored beside a pier
upon which large packing houses were built. The vessel was negligently set afire. The flames spread to the pier and consumed the
packing-houses. The libellants sued in admiralty to recover damages for their goods destroyed by the fire. The Supreme Court
ruled that admiralty did not have jurisdiction because the injury
was consummated on the pier, i.e., on land:
[T]he wrong and injury complained of must have been
committed wholly upon the high seas or navigable waters
or at least the substance and consummation of the same
must have taken place upon these waters to be within the
admiralty jurisdiction."
The doctrine established in The Plymouth was followed in later
cases.' 2 In The City of Lincoln" admiralty jurisdiction prevailed
in a suit for damages wherein a ship unloaded its cargo of steel
blooms onto a wharf which collapsed and precipitated the blooms
into the water. The court declared:
The whole 'substance and consummation of the injury' were
therefore in the water. It was the water that did the damage. That was the place of the damage, and consequently
4
the place of the tort for the purposes of jurisdiction.'
Some years later, however, the Supreme Court handed down, in
two companion cases, a new rule for admiralty jurisdiction which
ignored the consummation rule. In Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal
Co. 15 a longshoreman while unloading a vessel in navigable water
was swept from the deck by the ship's hoist and thrown to the
wharf. It was held that the personal injury suit was within admiralty jurisdiction. Similarly the Court in The Admiral Peoples 6
allowed a passenger, injured in a fall from a ship's faulty gang
plank to the pier, to sue in admiralty for the negligent cause of the
fall. In these cases the injuries complained of were "consummated"
10. 70 U.S. 20 (1865).
11. Id. at 35.

12. Ex Parte Phenix Ins. Co., 118 U.S. 610 (1886); Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co. v. City of Monterey, 6 F.2d 893 (N.D. Calif. 1925); Hermann v. Port
Blakely Mill Co., 69 Fed. 646 (N.D. Calif. 1895); The City of Lincoln, 25
Fed. 835 (S.D. N.Y. 1885); Leonard v. Decker, 22 Fed. 741 (S.D. N.Y. 1884).
13. 25 Fed. 835 (S.D NY 1885).
14. Id. at 837.
15. 295 U.S. 647 (1935).
16. 295 U.S. 649 (1935).
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The court, however,

limited The Plymouth to cases of injury caused by a vessel to per-

sons or property on the land. Here, the injuries were caused by
the vessels but the injured parties were on navigable water and
not land when the causes of action arose. In these cases the origin
of the tort was said to be determinative of admiralty jurisdiction:
The cause of action originated and the injury had commenced on the ship, the consummation somewhere being
inevitable. It is not of vital importance to the admiralty
jurisdiction whether the injury culminated on the string
piece of the wharf or in the water. 17
Thus, the rule of origin of the tort replaced that of consum8
mation in determining the applicability of admiralty jurisdiction.
In recent times admiralty jurisdiction has expanded in many
directions. Perhaps the greatest expansion came with the airplane' 9
and the inclusion of the air above navigable water within admiralty jurisdiction. In a landward movement, maritime law has been
applied through legislative enactments of the Admiralty Extension
Act,20 the Jones Act,2 1 and the Longshoremen's and Harborworker's

17. 295 U.S. at 653.
18. In 1948 Congress enacted the Admiralty Extension Act, 62 Stat.
496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964) which provides:
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall
extend to and include all cases of damage or injury by a vessel on
navigable' water notwithstanding that such damage or injury be
done or consummated on land....
The constitutionality of this Act was upheld in United States v. Matson Nay.
Co., 201 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1953); American Bridge Co. v. The Glovia 0, 98
F. Supp. 71 (E.D. N.Y. 1951).
The Act obviates the impact of the holding in The Plymouth and others.
It would seem that the Act still leaves the consummation case The City
of Lincoln at odds with the origin theory case The Admiral Peoples.
19. Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 91 n.23 (N.D. Calif.
1954):
At the beginning of the development of aviation in the United
States there was a considerable body of opinion that the entire
ocean of air surrounding the earth is within the admiralty jurisdiction, and that consequently all air flight is within the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction of the federal government. This theory
never received general acceptance and the federal legislation regulating air navigation has been based on the commerce clause of
the Constitution. However, the question whether the airspace over
the seas is within the jurisdiction of admiralty has received little

attention and remains an open one. See Knauth, Aviation and Ad-

miralty, 6 Air Law Review 226 (1935); Veeder, The Legal Relation
Between Aviation and Admiralty, 2 Air Law Review 29 (1931);
Report of the Special Committee on the law of Aviation of the
American Bar Association, 46 AMERicAN BAR ASSOCIATON REPORTS
77-97, 498-530 (1921); Bogert, Problems in Aviation Law, 6 CORNELL LAW Q. 271, 303-05 (1921).
In 1952, the Congress expressly
declared by statute that an aircraft, belonging to the United States
or to any United States citizen or corporation, while in flight above
the high seas is within the maritime jurisdiction of the United
States for purposes of the Criminal Statutes. See 66 Stat. 589, 18
U.S.C. § 7 (1964).
20. 62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).

21. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
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Compensation Act 22 to situations previously exclusively terrestrial.

In these two areas, airplane crashes into the sea 23 and longshoremen compensation claims, 24 the consummation theory of tort "locality" has been revived.
Comparison of Thomson with the aircraft cases is inevitable
because of the similarity of circumstances. In essence both embody personal injury claims evolved from negligence originating on
land precipitating an uninjured party to direct contact with the
water where the injury and tort are consummated. This parallelism was well recognized in the aircraft case Wilson v. Transocean
Airlines:2 5
[I] f there is no impact upon the person or property before
they strike the water it is recognized that the
tort occurs
2
upon the water within admiralty jurisdiction. 6
The court in Thomson declined to adopt the analogy and include
the tort claim within admiralty jurisdiction.
22. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903 (1964).
23. The first suits in admiralty involving airplane crashes into the sea
were based on the Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46
U.S.C. § 761 (1964). The Act provides for a cause of action in admiralty
for wrongful death occurring beyond one marine league from shore. Although no reference is made to aircraft in the Act, the cases clearly show
that claims for wrongful death arising from aircraft crashes into navigable
waters beyond the statutory distance are within the Act and admiralty
jurisdiction. See Lavello v. Danko, 175 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. N.Y. 1959); Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Calif. 1954); Lacey v.
L. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 916 (D. Mass. 1951); Choy v. Pan
American Airways Co., 1941 A.M.C. 483 (S.D. N.Y. 1941).
Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3rd Cir. 1963), extended admiralty jurisdiction to cover air crashes into navigable waters in
territorial waters less than one marine league from shore. D'Aleman v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958), recognized
the right of action in admiralty for a wrongful death occurring in the air
over the highseas by authority of Death on the High Seas Act.
The final extension of admiralty jurisdiction in this direction was announced in Notaican v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874 (W.D.
Pa. 1965), in which an airline passenger brought a tort claim for a nonfatal accident that occurred in the aircraft over navigable water and the
plane did not come in contact with the water.
It is evident, especially from the aircraft cases, that admiralty tort
jurisdiction does not depend upon the wrong having been committed on
board a vessel, but rather upon its having been committed upon navigable
water. In aircraft cases even though the origin of the tort admittedly
occurs on the land the cases are adjudicated in admiralty because they hold
that consummation of the tort in the water determines jurisdiction. The
result seems in direct contrast to the holding of The Admiral Peoples.
24. Thomson v. Bassett, 36 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mich. 1940), tried under the Compensation Act, concisely summarized the policy towards jurisdiction in this area: "[W]here the cause of action originating upon land
is completed on navigable water it is within the jurisdiction of admiralty."
Id. at 957.
25. 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Calif. 1954).
26. Id. at 92.
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Admiralty jurisdiction has also expanded under the Longshoremen's and Harborworker's Compensation Act. Cases arising under this Act have also relied on the consummation of the tort rule
in order to sustain admiralty jurisdiction. 27 A prime example of
this growth is Interlake Steamship Co. v. Nielsen. 28 Here a shipkeeper in the course of his employment was killed when he drove
his automobile off the end of a pier. After noting the broadening
of admiralty jurisdiction in other cases, the court concluded:
[TIhat the impetus which propelled claimant onto the ice
had a landbased origin-does not alter the fact that the
situs of his injury and death
was clearly within the scope
29
of admiralty jurisdiction.
It is to be noted that much confusion exists in relation between
Compensation Act cases and admiralty tort cases.30 The theory of
the Compensation Cases would clearly bring Thomson within admiralty jurisdiction. It must be stressed, however, that this theory was not applicable.
The Compensation Act states that compensation is payable for
disability or death of an employee only if such injury occurs upon
navigable waters of the United States and there is no compensation
provided by state law. The Act is to be liberally construed in order
to allow a qualified claimant to submit his claim under the Act. 31
The main thrust of the Act is to provide a special remedy for longshoremen and harborworkers. They are to be differentiated from
seamen and non-maritime people. It must be emphasized that the
compensation jurisdiction is extended for injuries that occur on
navigable waters. Navigable water and admiralty jurisdiction are
not synonymous.3 2 Thus there exist two separate and incompatible
27. See Interlake Steamship Co. v. Nielsen, 338 F.2d 879 (6th Cir.

1964); Thomson v. Bassett, 36 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mich. 1940); Marine
Stevedoring Corp. v. Oasting, 238 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. Va. 1965).
28. 338 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964).
29. Id. at 883.
30. See, e.g., Caldaro v. Baltimore and Ohio R. Co., 166 F. Supp. 833
(E.D. N.Y. 1956):
Neither The Admiral Peoples case nor other cases decided since
have recognized any distinction between the test of admiralty jurisdiction over torts and the test of the Longshoremen's Act coverage
....
Such a distinction would be anomalous since it was the purpose of the Longshoremen's Act to provide a remedy throughout
the area in which state compensation laws had been abrogated by
the assertions of exclusive federal jurisdiction in admiralty. Id.
at 836.
The legal encyclopedias fail to recognize any difference between the compensation, aircraft, or other admiralty tort cases. In 2 Am. Jun.2d Admiralty § 85 (1962), a general rule states that if a person or property is precipitated from land into the sea as a result of a wrongful act or omission
and there is no impact on the person or property before striking the water,
the tort for jurisdictional purposes is in admiralty. This rule is stated without qualification. See also 2 C.J.S. Admiralty § 65 (1936).
31. See Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
32. Michigan Mutual Liability Co. v. Arrien, 344 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.
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philosophies in regard to seemingly the same situation. That is, if
a stevedor falls from a defective wharf and is injured by his fall
into navigable water, the case is within admiralty jurisdiction, but
if the victim is a non-maritime civilian the case is outside that
jurisdiction. The key to the different standing is the status of the
party.

3s

It would seem that "locality" of the tort for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction is not as patently a settled point of law as may
be inferred from the broad pronouncements of some courts. Rather
it is a concept with subtle ramifications based on the status of the
injured party and the place and mode of injury. The conflict between compensation cases and other tort cases is understandable
because the compensation cases are governed by a statute grounded
on a social policy for the betterment of a limited group. Not so
comprehensible is the disagreement between the "aircraft" and
other tort cases. This disparity of conclusions drawn from essentially the same basic facts is anomalous. It illustrates an airborne
exception to general maritime law.
It is submitted that Thomson adopts the correct solution to this
confusing problem of admiralty tort jurisdiction. The court recog34
nizes that the aircraft and compensation cases are irreconcilable
with other maritime tort cases. Each type of case-aircraft, com1965):

[M]oreover, we are not persuaded that ancient decisions fixing the
limits of admiralty jurisdiction should be determinative when the

issue is whether a deputy commissioner's conclusion that an injury
occurred 'upon the navigable waters,' within the meaning of the
Compensation Act, is contrary to law. Indeed, the dissent's recognition that in enacting the 1927 Act Congress chose the phrase
'upon the navigable waters,' rather than 'within the admiralty jurisdiction,' suggests rejection, rather than adoption of distinctions
evolved in fixing the reach of the federal admiralty jurisdiction.
Id. at 645, n.3.
33. See Wiper v. Great Lakes Engineering Works, 340 F.2d 727 (6th
Cir. 1965). The court in Wiper pointed out the critical factor of party
status in determining the test for jurisdiction. In this case, the plaintiff's
decedent husband walked off a dock and was drowned in navigable water.
The plaintiff claimed that the dock was negligently maintained and that
the tort occurred in navigable water. The court, however, held that the
tort was complete upon the dock and the subsequent drowning did not go
to determine the maritime or non-maritime nature of the action but only
to the extent of damages. The opinion recognized that a maritime status
as stated in the Compensation Act is needed to prevent the fractional test
of locality of the tort from applying. The court concluded by distinguishing the Interlake case:

[T]here the coverage of the Longshoremen's and Harborworker's

Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 903a, was held to extend to a
claim for injury or death where the situs of the injury or death was
in navigable waters regardless of whether the cause had a land
based origin. In the present case it is the locality of the tort that
governs the question of whether maritime or state law is applicable
rather than the locality where the injuries or death occurred. ...
Id. at 731 [Emphasis added.]
34. 255 F. Supp. at 557; cf. 255 F. Supp. at 558.
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pensation, and tort-necessarily has its own theory of jurisdiction
particularly adapted to the exigencies sought to be served. The
remedy is effected by the Thomson court's announcement that the
origin of a tort defines its locality for the purposes of jurisdiction
and that aircraft and compensation claims are exceptions to this
rule. At last, there are bouys in the sea of admiralty tort jurisdiction.
DAVID C. JONES

INSURANCE-INSOLVENCY OF INSURER AS
DENYING LIABILITY FOR PURPOSES OF
UNINSURED MOTORIST PROVISION
Levy v. Keystone Ins. Co., 209 Pa. Super. 15, 223 A.2d 899 (1966).
The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Levy v. Keystone Ins.
Co.,' has ruled that when a tortfeasor was insured at the time of
an automobile accident and his insurer was subsequently declared
insolvent, the tortfeasor was not an "uninsured motorist" within
the meaning of the injured motorist's policy. The plaintiff's policy
provided coverage for personal injuries caused by the owner or operator of an "uninsured automobile." The policy defined an uninsured automobile as one to which neither a liability bond nor insurance policy was applicable at the time of the accident, or one whose
insurance company denied coverage thereunder.
Levy, in a suit against his insurer, contended that the insolvency of the tortfeasor's insurance company amounted to a denial
of coverage within the meaning of the policy; alternatively, that
the insolvency should be related back to the time of the accident
to determine whether or not the tortfeasor was insured. The lower
court dismissed Levy's suit and the superior court affirmed on the
grounds that there was no denial of coverage and that the time of
the accident determines the uninsured status of the tortfeasor.
The court reasoned that a denial of coverage contemplates an affirmative act by the insurance company; the involuntary insolvency of the tortfeasor's company could not be regarded as an affirmative act. Therefore insolvency did not constitute a denial of
coverage.
Among the jurisdictions that have considered the question, five,
joined by Pennsylvania in Levy, have held that a motorist whose
insurer becomes insolvent after an accident should not be considered as uninsured.2 Uninsured motorists coverage has been available only since 1956. 3 Consequently, there is little case law on
1. 209 Pa. Super. 15, 223 A.2d 899 (1963).
2. Federal Ins. Co. v. Speight, 220 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.S.C. 1963); Swaringin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 399 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. App. 1966); Uline v. Motor
Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 28 Misc. 2d 1002, 213 N.Y.S.2d 871
(Sup. Ct. 1961); Hardin v. American Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 61, 134
S.E.2d 142 (1964); Stone v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 397 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn.
App. 1965). Contra Katz v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 244 A.C.A. 1012,
53 Cal. Rptr. 669 (D.C. App. 1966); North River Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 244 S.C.
393, 137 S.E.2d 264 (1964); State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower,
204 Va. 887, 134 S.E.2d 277 (1964).
3. Fairgrave and Forney, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 31 INs. CouNsFL J. 665 (1964). In 1957 New Hampshire became the first state to enact
a statute requiring Uninsured Motorist Coverage provisions in all automobile liability policies, N.H. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 268:15 (Replacement 1966).
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point.4 Only nine states have considered the question whether a
motorist whose insurer becomes insolvent after an accident should
be considered as uninsured.5 None of the reported decisions has
accepted the argument raised in Levy that the insolvency should be
related back to the time of the accident. 6 Not all of these decisions, however, have considered the alternative issue raised in
Levy, that insolvency is a "denial of coverage" within the meaning
of the policy. 7 There is a split among the cases which have considered the "denial" issue. Two jurisdictions, Pennsylvania (in
Levy) and New York," have ruled that insolvency is not a "denial"
because denial requires an affirmative act on the part of the insurer. As the Levy court said:
A denial of coverage usually arises where there is coverage, but because of some action on the part of the inMany other states have recently enacted similar statutes. E.g., ALA. CODE
tit. 36, § 74(62a) (Supp. 1965); ALASKA STAT. § 28.20.440 (Supp. 1966);
CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (Supp. 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.0851 (Supp.
1966); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 181-447 (Supp. 1965); MIcH. COMP. LAWS §
500.3010 (1948) (P.A. 388, Stat. Ann. Cur. Mat. § 24.13010 1965); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN.

§ 22:1406(D) (Supp. 1964); MASS.

GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch. 90 § 34L

(Supp. 1966); N.Y. INS. LAW § 167-2-a (1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21
(Replacement 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 2000 (Supp. 1966); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 46-750.11-.14 (1962), as amended § 46-750.31 (Supp. 1966); VA.
CODE ANN.

§ 38.1-381 (Supp. 1966).

4. See, Annot. 79 A.L.R.2d 1252 (1961).
5. Federal Ins. Co. v. Speight, 220 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. S.C. 1963); Katz
v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 244 A.C.A 1012, 53 Cal. Rptr. 669 (D.C. App.
1966); Topalewski v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exchange, 148 N.W.2d 906
(Mich. 1967); Swaringin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 399 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. App. 1966);
Uline v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp., 28 Misc.2d 1002, 213
N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Hardin v. American Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 261
N.C. 61, 134 S.E.2d 142 (1964); Rice v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 267
N.C. 421, 148 S.E.2d 223 (1966); Levy v. Keystone Ins. Co., 209 Pa. Super.
15, 223 A.2d 899 (1966); North River Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 244 S.C. 393, 137
S.E.2d 264 (1964); Stone v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 397 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn.
App. 1965); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower, 204 Va. 887, 134
S.E.2d 227 (1964). At least five states include in their statutes as uninsured
a motorist whose insurer becomes insolvent subsequent to an accident; see
note 12 infra.
6. E.g., Swaringin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 399 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. App.
1966); Hardin v. American Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 61, 134 S.E.2d 142
(1964); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower, 204 Va. 887, 134 S.E.2d
277 (1964).
7. The only cases which appear to have considered the issue of
whether the insolvency is a denial are, Katz v. American Motorist Ins. Co.,
244 A.C.A. 1012, 53 Cal. Rptr. 669 (D.C. App. 1966); Uline v. Motor Vehicle
Acc. Indemnification Corp., 28 Misc.2d 1002, 213 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct.
1961); Levy v. Keystone Ins. Co., 209 Pa. Super. 15, 223 A.2d 899 (1966);
North River Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 244 S.C. 393, 137 S.E.2d 264 (1964); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower, 204 Va. 887, 134 S.E.2d 227 (1964).
Only the Uline decision had reached a result in accord with Levy, that the
insolvency is not a "denial."
8. Uline v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp., 28 Misc.2d 1002,
213 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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sured the company refused to respond. This refusal could
be for lack of cooperation by the insurer, fraud perpetrated by the insured on the company, or serving late notice of the accident, to mention a few. There was no denial
of coverage in these cases. 9
Other courts, however, have held that "denial" does not necessarily contemplate an affirmative act by the insurer. 10 Insolvency
of the insurer places the insured in the same financial position as
would any affirmative action by the insurance company. Although
insolvency is not a voluntary, affirmative act by the insurance
company in response to an act by the insured, these courts hold that
insolvency is an effective denial within the coverage provided by
the policy." This interpretation is consistent with purpose of the
statutes making uninsured motorists coverage mandatory, 12 i.e., to
provide innocent motorists protection from financially irresponsible drivers. 13
The Levy court recognized the social policy which requires a
liberal construction of uninsured motorist provisions.14 The court
felt, however, that the "denial" provision of this policy was unam9. 209 Pa. Super. at 20, 223 A.2d at 901.
10. Katz v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 244 A.C.A. 1012, 53 Cal. Rptr.
669 (D.C. App. 1966); North River Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 244 S.C. 393, 137 S.E.
2d 264 (1964); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower, 204 Va. 887, 134
S.E.2d 227 (1964).
11. Ibid.
12. See note 3, supra. At least five states have included as "uninsured," the motorist whose company becomes insolvent subsequent to an
accident, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.0851(2) (Supp. 1966); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 22:1406(D) (2) (Supp. 1964); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 500.3010 (1948) (P.A.
388, Stat. Ann. Cur. Mat. § 24.13010 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21
(b) (3) (Replacement 1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.31(c) (Supp. 1966).
When this is done by amendment to a statute already requiring the provision, the courts may be uncertain whether the legislature meant to clarify
the previous statute or add to it. Compare Fed. Ins. Co. v. Speight, 220 F.
Supp. 90 (E.D. S.C. 1963), (added to the statute), with North River Ins.
Co. v. Gibson, 244 S.C. 393, 137 S.E.2d 264 (1964), (clarified the previous
statute).
13. See, Hein v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 106 N.H. 378, 213 A.2d 197
(1965); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Howe, 106 N.H. 422, 213 A.2d 420 (1965);
Lovering v. Erie Indemnity Co., 412 Pa. 551, 195 A.2d 365 (1963); Laird v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964); Hobbs v. Buckeye
Union Cas. Co., 212 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Va. 1962); American Universal Ins.
Co. v. Ransom, 59 Wash.2d 811, 370 P.2d 867 (1962). See generally, 7
APPELMAN, INSURANCE § 4331 (1962, Supp. 1966); 7 BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE
LAW AND PRACTICE-INSURANCE § 274.2 (3d ed. 1966); 12 COUCH, INSURANCE
§ 45:619-657 (2d ed. 1964); Fairgrave and Forney, Uninsured Motorist
Coverage, 31 INS. COUNSEL J. 665 (1964); Kasdorf, Protection Against the

Uninsured Motorist, 31 INS. COUNSEL J. 674 (1964); Ward, The Uninsured

Motorist, 9 BuF. L. REV. 283 (1960); The Financially Irresponsible Motorist,
10 VILL. L. REV. 545 (1965); Annot. 79 A.L.R.2d 1252 (1961).
14. 209 Pa. Super. at 19-20, 223 A.2d at 901. See, Lovering v. Erie
Indemnity Co., 412 Pa. 551, 554, 195 A.2d 365, 367 (1963). Uninsured motorist coverage has been mandatory in Pennsylvania since 1964; see, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 2000 (Supp. 1966).
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biguous. Absent ambiguity, the court was unwilling to include
insolvency within the meaning of the term "denial." It is submitted that "denial" is more ambiguous than the court was willing
to admit. Even though the term may have a recognized meaning
within the insurance industry, should the court conclude that the
insured attached the same interpretation to it? Other courts have
held that insolvency amounts to a denial. 15 In view of the courts'
inability to agree, how is the insured to know that "denial" includes only affirmative action by the insurer. If the insurer fails
to adequately define the term in the policy, it should be construed
strictly against the insurer.' 6 From the insured's point of view,
the effects of insolvency are no different from the effects of an affirmative "denial." Since nothing in the policy alerts the insured
be permitted to make use
to the difference, the insurer should not
17
of a fine distinction to escape liability.
WILLIAM S. KIESFn

15. Katz v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 244 A.C.A. 1012, 53 Cal. Rptr.
669 (D.C. App. 1966); North River Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 244 S.C. 393, 137
S.E.2d 264 (1964); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower, 204 Va. 887,
134 S.E.2d 227 (1964).
16. E.g., Blue Anchor Overall Co. v. Pennsylvania Lumberman's Mut.
Ins., 385 Pa. 394, 397, 123 A.2d 413, 415 (1956).
17. Beckham v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 424 Pa. 107, 115, 225 A.2d 532, 536
(1967).

DISCOVERY-PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE NOT
WAIVED BY BRINGING SUIT FOR
PERSONAL INJURIES
Bond v. Independent Order of Foresters, 421 P.2d 351 (Wash. 1966).
In a suit for personal injuries, defendant's deposition of plaintiff revealed the names of two doctors who had treated her for her
injuries. Thereafter defendants sought a pretrial deposition of one
of the doctors. When questions were propounded as to his examination, consultation and treatment of plaintiff, her attorneys objected on the ground that such inquiry was barred by the physician-patient privilege afforded by statute.' The trial court upon
defendant's motion ordered the doctor to answer the questions on
the ground that by commencing the suit for damages for personal
injuries, plaintiff had waived the physician-patient privilege. On
review, the Supreme Court of Washington in Bond v. Independent
Order of Foresters2 reversed, holding that bringing an action
to recover for personal injuries does not constitute a waiver of
the privilege.
There was no physician-patient privilege at common law.s
Today the privilege exists by statute in approximately two-thirds
of the states.4 The chief policy of the statute is "to encourage full
and frank disclosures to the medical adviser, by relieving the patient from the fear of embarrassing consequences."5 The privilege
is, however, subject to a great deal of criticism on the ground that
its practical employment has resulted only in the suppression of
useful evidence.6
The physician-patient privilege can be waived expressly or
impliedly by the conduct of the person claiming it. 7 Depending
upon the wording of the statute creating the privilege and the
related discovery rules, there can be several results when the plaintiff in a personal injury suit invokes the privilege to resist defend1. Wash. Code of 1881 § 392; but see note 16 infra.
2. 421 P.2d 351 (Wash. 1966).
3.

8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (McNaughton Rev. 1961); McCoRMICK,

EVIDENCE §

101

(1954);

PHYSICIAN AND PATIE]NT

DEWITT, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS

BETWEEN

9-13 (1958).

8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3,§ 2380 n.5.
5. Arizona & N.M. Ry. v. Clark, 235 U.S. 669, 677 (1915); see DEWTT,
op. cit. supra note 3, 22-30; McCoRmICK, op. cit. supra note 3,§§ 101, 108.
6. For a thorough discussion of the policy and criticism of the privilege see DEWITT, op. cit. supra note 3, 22-39; see also 8 WIGMORE, op. cit.
supra note 3, § 2380a; Chafee, Privileged Communications:Is Justice Served
or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand? 52 YALE
L.J. 607 (1943).
7. Cf. Munzer v.Swedish American Line, 35 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y.

4.

1940).
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ant's attempt to discover information from plaintiff's doctor.8 The
court may rule that the privilege is not waived by the commence-

ment of the action; 9 it may rule that the privilege continues until
the patient calls his physician to testify 0 or until plaintiff testifies
as to his condition;" it may rule that plaintiff's cause of action will
be stayed until he permits discovery; 12 the court may also rule that
there is no waiver upon commencement of the action but plaintiff
must decide during pretrial whether to waive the privilege. 8
In some states the statutes provide that if any party in a pending action offers evidence with reference to his physical condition4
or its cause, the privilege shall be deemed to have been waived.
In other states, such as Pennsylvania, it is provided that there is no
privilege whatever when the patient is the plaintiff in a civil suit
to recover damages for personal injuries.' 5 Where these statutes
are in effect, there is no problem with the physician-patient privilege when the patient becomes a plaintiff. When the statute does

not expressly provide for waiver, however, a great deal of litigation
has resulted.
The Washington statute involved in Bond provided:
The following persons shall not be examined as witnesses:
(4)

A regular physician or surgeon shall not, without

8. See generally 8 WIGMORE, Op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 2389, 2390.
9. E.g., Bond v. Independent Order of Foresters, 421 P.2d 351 (Wash.
1966).
10. E.g., Boyd v. Wrisley, 228 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. Mich. 1964); McUne v.
Fuqua, 42 Wash. 2d 65, 253 P.2d 632 (1953).
11. E.g., Munzer v. Swedish American Line, supra note 7.
12. E.g., Kriger v. Holland Furnace Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 44, 208 N.Y.S.
2d 285 (1960); Tripp v. Knox, 5 Misc. 2d 771, 165 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Spec. T.
1956).
13. E.g., Greene v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 40 F.R.D. 14 (N.D. Ohio
1966); Mariner v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 202 F. Supp. 430 (N.D.
Ohio 1962).
14. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.080 (Supp. 1963) provides:
A licensed physician or surgeon shall not, without the consent of
his patient, be examined as a witness to any information acquired
in attending the patient which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient; provided:
4. That where any person brings an action to recover damages for
personal injuries, such action shall be deemed to constitute a
consent by the person bringing such action that any physician
who has prescribed for or treated the person and whose testimony is material in the action shall testify.
15. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 328 (1958) provides:
No person authorized to practice physics or surgery shall be allowed, in any civil case, to disclose any information which he acquired in attending the patient in a professional capacity, and
which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, which
shall tend to blacken the character of the patient, without consent
of said patient, except in civil cases, brought by such patient, for
damages on account of personal injuries.
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the consent of his patient, be examined in a civil action as
to any information acquired in attending such patient,
to enable him to prescribe or act for
which was necessary
6
the patient.'

The Bond court decided the case on a literal application of the
statute: "The legislature expressly provided that a . . . physician

. . . shall not be examined in a civil action as to any information
acquired in attending a patient, without such patient's consent.
This legislative enactment is a clear and positive mandate."' 7 The
court also pointed out that plaintiff's testifying to the nature and
extent of her injuries did not constitute a waiver of the privilege
because she was required to do so by the discovery rules of court
and testified as an adverse witness.' s
A strong dissent in Bond argued that the policy of Washington's discovery rules is the same as the policy of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, i.e., to minimize or eliminate the "game or sporting theory of justice in the trial of lawsuits, and substitute a search
for the truth as the ultimate purpose of courtroom proceedings." 19
Plaintiff's answers to interrogatories revealed earlier claims for injuries against another company. By allowing plaintiff to seal the
lips of her physician, the majority permitted her to conceal valuable testimony regarding her physical condition before and after
the injury for which the present action was brought. It appears
unjust to allow plaintiff to invoke the privilege in order to conceal prior injuries for which the present defendant is certainly
not responsible.
The majority rule is that the bringing of an action in which an
essential issue is the existence of a physical ailment does not constitute a waiver of the privilege. It has been urged, however, by
authorities that such an action should result in a waiver of all communications concerning that ailment.20 This appears to be the better view since a plaintiff by seeking recovery for personal injuries
16. This statute was amended in 1965 to read:

(4) A regular physician or surgeon shall not, without the consent
of his patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information
acquired in attending such patient which was necessary to enable
him to prescribe or act for the patient, but this exception shall not
apply in any judicial proceedings regarding a child's injuries, neglect or sexual abuse, or the cause thereof.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (Supp. 1966). This amendment would not,

however, have changed the result in the Bond case.

17. 421 P.2d at 353.
18. Id. at 354. See Randa v. Bear, 50 Wash. 2d 415, 421, 312 P.2d 640,
644 (1957); Packard v. Coberly, 147 Wash. 345, 347, 265 Pac. 1082, 1083
(1928); Harpman v. Devine, 133 Ohio St. 1, 5, 10 N.E.2d 776, 778 (1937).
Compare Munzer v. Swedish Am. Line, 35 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1940)
(proceeding under Fed. R. Civ. P. 33).
19. 421 P.2d 351, 354 (dissenting opinion).
20. See 8 WIOMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2389; McCoRMIcK, op. cit.
supra note 3, § 106; DEWITT, op. cit. supra note 3, 391-92; see cases cited in
DEWITT, supra at 392 n.5.
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voluntarily puts his physical condition into the public eye and is
required to show the nature of his illness and the treatment he received for it. Once this is done, the reason for the privilege is no
longer present and enforcing the privilege will seriously and often
unfairly hamper the defense. It has been said that "the injury to
justice by the repression of the facts of corporal injury and disease
is much greater than any injury which might be done by disclosure."21
Even when the privilege is found to be waived by bringing
plaintiff's physical condition into issue, there is a conflict of authority concerning whether the waiver applies to the trial itself or
extends to pretrial procedure as well. It has been held in New
York that the privilege is not waived until trial and that defendant
may apply, at the time of such waiver, for a suspension of the trial
so as to examine plaintiff's physicians. 22 This view appears to be
impractical. Why should the defendant have to wait until the trial
and then request a suspension if it appears from plaintiff's pleadings that he must necessarily divulge the nature and extent of his
injuries? Recent New York decisions have somewhat repudiated
the old rule by holding that while the privilege is not waived by
bringing suit, if waiver at trial is almost inevitable, plaintiff's action will be stayed unless he permits the defendant to discover the
necessary information. 23 Other recent cases have reasoned that
plaintiff may not continue his action and at the same time deny
defendant the right to avail himself
of the pretrial procedures
24
necessary to prepare his defense.
25
In Mathis v. Hilderbrand,
under a rule similar to the Wash26
ington statute, the court held that plaintiff had, by commencing
the action, waived the privilege to the extent that his physicians
might be required to testify on deposition with respect to the injuries sued upon. After noting that it is commonly held that a
plaintiff waives the privilege when he voluntarily testifies concerning the injuries being sued upon, the court said:
[C]ommon sense dictates against enforcing the privilege
until it has actually been waived during trial, as it almost
invariably must be, and then in fairness being required to
21. 8 WiGMoRE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2380a.

22. Rubin v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of United States, 269 App.
Div. 677, 53 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1945); Lorde v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 252 App. Div. 646, 300 N.Y.S. 721 (1937); but see, Padovani v. Liggett
& Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F.R.D. 255 (E.D.N.Y. 1959) (reluctantly following
N.Y. law).
23. Kriger v. Holland Furnace Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 44, 208 N.Y.S.2d
285 (1960); Tripp v. Knox, 5 Misc. 2d 771, 165 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Spec. T. 1956).
24. Awtry v. United States, 27 F.R.D. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Mariner v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 202 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Greene
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 40 F.R.D. 14 (N.D. Ohio 1966); Mathis v. Hilderbrand, 416 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1966).
25. 416 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1966).
26. ALASKA R. Cir.P. 43 (h) (4).
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for a continuance to meet the
grant defendant's request
27
new matter disclosed.
In Bond the majority stated that whether or not the physicianpatient privilege should be deemed waived when a civil action for
personal injuries is instituted is a question for the legislature.
The dissent, however, pointed out that defendant could be prevented from conducting a fishing expedition into plaintiff's personal
matters or harrassing plaintiff by the trial court's order limiting
defendant's inquiry to matters reasonably relating to the injuries
claimed in the suit. 28 This is the view taken by the Alaska court
in Mathis and it appears to be the best solution to the problem in
lieu of a legislative amendment.
WILLIAM T. DYzR

27.
28.

416 P.2d at 10.
421 P.2d 351, 355-56.

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE-MEDICAL PAYMENT
COVERAGE-MAY AN INJURED PASSENGER
COLLECT HIS MEDICAL EXPENSES TWICE?
Beschnett v. Farmers Equitable Ins. Co., 146 N.W.2d 861 (Minn.

1966)
Plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile driven by defendant's insured. He was injured when the insured's automobile collided with another vehicle. An action was brought in tort
against both drivers. Plaintiff was awarded a $14,000 judgment
which included special damages for medical expenses. Defendant
satisfied the judgment pro rata pursuant to the liability provisions
of the driver's policy. Thereafter, plaintiff instituted this action in
contract against the defendant-insurer to again recover the medical
expenses. The suit was brought under the driver's medical-payment coverage. Plaintiff claimed that this coverage was separate
from the liability coverage and as a third party beneficiary of the
medical-payment contract he was entitled to an additional award
of medical expenses. The Supreme Court of Minnesota in Beschnett
v. Farmers Equitable Ins. Co.' upheld plaintiff's claim:
[U] nder the conditions here present the medical provisions
of the defendant's contract of insurance constitute a collateral source of payment, and up to the limits of the policy
plaintiffs have a right to recover such medical expenses
notwithstanding they were included in the2 recovery previously realized under the liability coverage.
1. 146 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. 1966).
2. Id. at 865. The Collateral Source Rule is a rule of compromise in
the law of damages. When an injured plaintiff has already received compensation for an element of damages for which the tortfeasor would otherwise be liable, the courts must resolve the conflict between two other basic
rules of damages: (1) The plaintiff is entitled to full compensation by the
wrongdoer and (2) The benefit accruing to the plaintiff as a result of the
injury should be credited to the tortfeasor in an award of damages. Realizing that one of the rules must yield, the courts apply the equitable Collateral Source Rule: any compensation or indemnity for the injury of the
plaintiff received from a source wholly independent of the wrongdoer,
should not be credited to the tortfeasor in mitigation of a damages award.
See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 99 (1941); MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 90 (1935); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 920, comment e (1939). The development and application of the Collateral Source Rule is replete with fine distinctions, many of
which arise in connection with recovery under the medical-payment coverage hereinafter discussed. These situations are beyond the scope of this
article but it is worthy to note that the passenger could conceivably receive
three or more recoveries of his medical expenses. Compare the fact situations in the following cases: Masaki v. Columbia Cas. Co., 48 Hawaii 136,
395 P.2d 927 (1964); Johnson v. N.J. Mfrs. Indem. Ins. Co., 69 N.J. Super.
184, 174 A.2d 4 (1961); Kopp v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 53, 94 N.W.2d
224 (1959).
For a thorough analysis of the Collateral Source Rule see
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Few reported decisions have presented the exact fact situation
as found in Beschnett. More frequently, the cases involve an injured passenger who has previously collected medical expenses
from the insurer under the driver's medical-payment coverage.
Upon bringing an action in tort against the insured driver, an issue
at the trial is whether the passenger can have his medical expenses
included in an award of compensatory damages, or conversely,
whether the driver can diminish the damages by the amount already paid under the medical-payment coverage. A vast majority
of jurisdictions hold that the driver should receive credit for the
medical expenses already paid to the passenger. 3 These courts emphasize that the driver, not the insurer, is the superficial defendant in such cases. Having paid separate premiums for two coverages, the insured should not be penalized for having provided his
injured passenger with a source of immediate payment of medical
expenses. A persuasive analogy is made to the situation of the
tortfeasor personally paying for the injured party's medical expenses prior to the trial. 4 In such cases the plaintiff's damages
award does not include a second recovery of the medical expenses
previously paid. 5 Viewed in this light, the medical-payment coverage is not from a source independent of the insured since he
contracted and paid the premiums for the two coverages. The collateral source rule is therefore not applicable.
When the passenger chooses to first sue the insured-driver in
tort and the insurer thereafter on the contract, as in the Beschnett
§ 25.22 (1956); Auerbach, The Collateral Source
Rule, 21 OHIO ST. L. J. 231 (1960); Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The
Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 219 (1953); James, Social
Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternate Remedies, 27 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 537 (1952); Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American
Law of Damages, 46 MrNN. L. Rsv. 669 (1962); Norris, The Collateral Source
Doctrine: An Increasing Problem, 1959 INs. L. J. 488; Schwartz, The Collateral-Source Rule, 41 B.U.L. REV. 348 (1961); West, The Collateral Source
Rule Sans Subrogation:A Plaintiff's Windfall, 16 OKLA. L. REv. 395 (1963);
Note, 77 HARV. L. REv. 741 (1964).
3. Adams v. Turner, 238 F. Supp. 643 (D.D.C. 1965); Turner v. Mannon, 236 Cal. App. 2d 134, 45 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1965); Dodds v. Burknum, 214
Cal. App. 2d 206, 29 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1963); Yarrington v. Thornburg, 198
A.2d 181 (Del. Super. Ct. 1964), aff'd, 205 A.2d 1 (Del. 1965); Gunter v.
Lord, 242 La. 943, 140 So. 2d 11 (1962); Moore v. Leggette, 24 App. Div. 2d,
264 N.Y.S.2d 765, reversing 45 Misc. 2d 603, 257 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. 1965);
Tart v. Register, 257 N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754 (1962); Jordan v. Blackwelder,
250 N.C. 189, 108 S.E.2d 429 (1959) (by implication); Chambers v. Pinson,
6 Ohio App. 2d 66, 216 N.E.2d 394 (1966); Contra, Truitt v. Gaines, 199 F.
Supp. 143 (D. Del. 1961) (Applying Delaware law; later disregarded in
Yarrington v. Thornburg, supra); Long v. Landy, 35 N.J. 44, 171 A.2d 1
(1961); Edmondson v. Keller, 401 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
4. See, e.g., Adams v. Turner, 238 F. Supp. 643 (D.D.C. 1965): "Suppose, for example, the defendant himself paid the plaintiff's entire medical
bill ... prior to the trial. Obviously, the plaintiff would not be paid twice
for the same item ..
" Id. at 645.
5. See Goodwin v. Giovenelli, 117 Conn. 103, 167 Atl. 87 (1933).
HARPER & JAMES, TORTS
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case, the courts are in accord that the medical-payment coverage
is a collateral source of recovery. Here the decisions are grounded
on a strict construction of the policy against the defendant-insurer.
The argument is developed in the following manner: Although
contained in the same policy as the liability coverage, the medicalpayment coverage is a separate and divisible provision. 7 The
medical coverage is more akin to personal accident insurance than
to indemnity insurance since it is payable regardless of the driver's
liability or even the existence of liability insurance.' The injured
passenger, therefore, has a direct contractual cause of action
against the insurer if it denies payment on the ground that the
passenger already recovered his medical expenses. The insurer's
defense is held ineffectual, however, because the previous award of
medical expenses is said to be from a source independent of the
insurer. Thus, the collateral source rule is invoked and the passenger is allowed a windfall. Paradoxically, in granting the double
recovery, these courts also stress the fact that separate premiums
were paid for the two coverages. In this instance, however, the
tendency is to emphasize that the premiums were paid to the insurer. The Beschnett court emphatically approved the equitable
result in Moore v. Leggette,9 a New York case which implied that
the insurer would be getting away with something if only one
recovery was permitted. Thus, the Moore court preferred to give
the passenger a "no charge-double recovery bonanza." 10
Only one jurisdiction has construed both the tort and contract
situations. After many conflicting lower court opinions, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held in a tort action against the insured
that the passenger should not receive a double recovery.1" This
6. Barbour v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 141 A.2d 924 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1958) (by implication); Severson v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 265 Wis.
488, 61 N.W.2d 872 (1953); cf. Rogers v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 182 A.2d 825 (D.C.
Munic. Ct. App. 1962) (employer automobile liability insurance); Hark v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., 175 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1965) (uninsured motorist provision), Sims v. National Cas. Co., 171 So. 2d 399 (Fla. App. 1965) (uninsured motorist provision). But cf. Rosen v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 189
So. 2d 395 (Fla. App. 1966) (property liability insurance). Contra, Wise v.
Agriculture Ins. Co., 140 So. 2d 662 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
7. 265 Wis. 488, 61 N.W.2d 872 (1953); see also Siebert v. State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co., 251 Iowa 1060, 103 N.W.2d 757 (1960); Johnson v. New Jersey
Mfrs. Indem. Ins. Co., 69 N.J. Super. 184, 174 A.2d 4 (1961); Anthony v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 204 Pa. Super. 752, 205 A.2d 639 (1964) (dictum).
But see Pugh v. Travelers Indem. Co., 166 So. 2d 373 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
8. See 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4896 (1962); 6
BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3998 (Supp.
1964).
9. 45 Misc. 2d 603, 257 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 24 A.D.2d 891,
264 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1965).
10. 45 Misc. 2d 603, 606, 257 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
11. Gunter v. Lord, 242 La. 943, 104 So. 2d 11 (1962). The prior cases
granting double recovery: Constantine v. Bankers Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
129 So. 2d 269 (La. Ct. App. 1961); Dumas v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,
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case was cited as controlling in a later decision which involved a
contract action against an insurer. 12 In both decisions the courts
ignored the majority rule that the coverages afford the passenger
with separate and divisible causes of action against "separate"
defendants. Instead, the automobile liability policy was construed
as a whole. The courts reasoned that the intent of the contracting parties did not encompass a double recovery by the passenger.
Since the intent of the parties was not objectively manifested in
either of the Louisiana cases the courts supplied this important
contractual element to reach an equitable result.13
The wording of the typical medical-payment coverage is not
complex.1 4 The simplicity of the provision, however, has perhaps
led to the increasing amount of recent litigation concerning its
application in multiple-recovery situations. Most provisions do
not contain set-off or subrogation clauses to cover the double recovery problem. The Beschnett court gave great weight to the
omission of a specific provision excluding double recovery.
Presumably, since the Severson decision in 1953 [allowing
double recovery], 15 automobile insurers have been on notice that they are exposed to double liability under policies
of this kind. They apparently have not taken measures to
125 So. 2d 12 (La. Ct. App. 1960) rev'd. on other grounds, 241 La. 1096, 134
So. 2d 45 (1961); Distafano v. Delta Fire & Cas. Co., 98 So. 2d 310 (La. Ct.
App. 1957). Cf., Warren v. Fidelity Mut. Ins. Co., 99 So. 2d 382 (La. Ct.
App. 1957). The prior cases denying double recovery: Bowers v. Hardware
Mut. Cas. Co., 119 So. 2d 671 (La. Ct. App. 1960); Hawayek v. Simmons, 91
So. 2d 49 (La. Ct. App. 1956). See also Debautle v. Southern Farm Bureau
Cas. Ins. Co., 170 So. 2d 234 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
12. Wise v. Agriculture Ins. Co., 140 So. 2d 662 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
13. The Louisiana court experienced less difficulty than will most
courts in denying a double recovery in both the tort and contract actions.
Unlike most states, Louisiana has a direct action statute which permits the
insurer to be joined as a party-defendant in the tort suit against the insured. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (Supp. 1964). The issue of the in-

surer's obligation to indemnify the insured for a liability judgment awarded

the passenger is thus litigated in the same action which establishes that
liability. Gunter v. Lord, 242 La. 943, 949, 140 So. 2d 11, 15 (1962). Since
the insurer would be an "announced" defendant, paying a money judgment,
in both the contract and tort actions, the Louisiana courts found it easier
to dismiss the Collateral Source Rule and its test of "independent source."
See note 2 supra. In other states, however, where the insurer is not announced as a party to the prior tort suit, the Collateral Source Rule as

applied in Beschnett will be a compelling argument for a double recovery

in the later contract action.
14. In essence, the coverage provides that any passenger who is injured while in, alighting from, or entering the insured's automobile shall be
paid the value of reasonable medical expenses incurred within a specified
period (generally, one year) and to a stated limit ($500 to $10,000, at the
option of the insured at the time of contracting for the insurance). Some
coverages vary as to extended protection afforded the insured or his family.
See generally Note, 34 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 495 (1966).
15. Severson v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 265 Wis. 488, 61 N.W.2d 872
(1953).
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exclude such recovery by limiting payments to cases of no
liability or to require that credit be given if liability is established. 16
It is clear that the issue of double recovery could be prevented
by inserting a set-off provision in the "conditions" section of the
policy. 17 In addition, the claimant could be required to execute a
release upon recovery under either the liability or medical coverages.18 Such devices would be appropriate, however, only if the
medical-payment coverage was intended by the contracting parties
to be an alternate rather than a collateral source of recovery. Absent specific language in the policy, the courts can only make a
judicial estimation of the intended purpose of the medical-payment
coverage. The results of the cases are certainly diametric. Until
the courts agree on the intended purpose of the medical coverage, or
the policy is written to clearly manifest the parties' intent, it appears that the courts will continue to construe the medical coverage as collateral to the insurer but not collateral to the insured.
Several writers have expressed their views on the purpose of
the medical coverage. 19 Based on formal and informal communica16. 146 N.W.2d at 865.
17. For the wording of set-off provisions currently under consideration
by the national underwriting organization see Katz, Automobile Medical
Payments Coverage-A Changing Concept?, 28 INs. COUNSEL J. 276 (1961).
At least two courts have construed a clause presently inserted in the "conditions" section of some automobile liability insurance policies, and arrived
at opposite results. The court in Gunter v. Lord, 242 La. 943, 140 So. 2d 11
(1962) held that the following policy provision effectively excluded a
double recovery: "The Company may pay the injured person or any person
or organization rendering the [medical] services and such payment shall
reduce the amount payable hereunder for such injury." 242 La. at 946, 140
So. 2d at 13. An identical provision was deemed not effective as a set-off
provision in Severson v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 265 Wis. 488, 61 N.W.2d
872 (1953). A close reading of this condition would reveal that the Severson court applied the proper construction. See Bowers v. Hardware Mut.
Cas. Co., 119 So. 2d 671 (La. Ct. App. 1960) for a case construing a set-off
provision explicitly and effectively excluding a double recovery.
18. It is highly probable that this device is most often utilized by
insurance companies. This would explain the relatively few reported cases

concerning the double recovery problem. The release must be carefully

drawn, however. The Beschnett court denied the insurer's claim that the
following release included the company: "[W]e ... do hereby release,
acquit and forever discharge [the insured], his/their heirs, representatives,
successors and assigns, . .. ."146 N.W.2d at 863. The court impliedly approved one which ran to the insured and "his heirs, executors, administrators, agents and assigns, and all other persons, firms or corporations liable
or who might be claimed to be liable." 146 N.W.2d at 862.
19. Katz, Automobile Medical Payments Coverage-A Changing Concept?, 28 INs. CouN. J. 276 (1961); Note, 34 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 495 (1966);
Note, 1955 WIs. L. REv. 483. See also 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 4896 (1962); Ramsey, Medical Payments Under the Automobile
Liability Policy, 1955 INs. L. J. 25. "The basic purpose of medical pay provisions ... is to make available a fund to assure prompt and adequate
medical care when injury is incurred, to relieve the physical suffering of
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tions with the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the
Mutual Casualty Insurance Rating Bureau, the consensus is that
the original purposes of the coverage were three-fold:
(1) To provide an immediate source for payment of medical
expenses incurred as a result of injuries sustained in both fault
and no fault accidents, thus alleviating the driver's moral concern
and the passenger's anxiety concerning the expenses.
(2) To especially provide a source of payment for passengers
in guest-statute states where liability recovery was difficult.
(3) To create a good-will rapport among the passenger, driver
and insurer, thus acting as a "buffer" against a future action in
20
tort.

All of the above advantages accruing from the medical coverage are commendable. None, however, appear sufficient to justify
the further conclusion that a fourth purpose was to provide a windfall to the passenger. The authorities disagree among each other
on this point. 21 It is acknowledged, however, that such a purpose
became accepted in the insurance industry. The lack of evidence
that the insurers ever took affirmative steps to insert an acceptable
set-off clause into the policy certainly substantiates the industry's
acquiescence in the passenger's double recovery. Since purposes
(1) and (2) are impliedly provided for in the wording of the coverage it must be concluded that the insurers have been persuaded
by purpose (3) to permit a double recovery. Moreover, it has been
suggested that the underwriters are fully cognizant of the collateral source implications of the medical-payment coverage.2 2 A
simple expedient solves the problem, however, as the underwriters
merely calculate the effect of the passenger's windfall when computing the coverage rates. The results are higher rates.
If it is true that the underlying reason for writing the medical
coverage provision without a set-off clause is to "buffer" liability,
the reason would appear to be an indirect, ineffective and undesirable means of decreasing litigation. The coverage provides for only
a minimum limit of recovery and obviously pertains only to medical expenses. More important, it is available to the injured passenger in both fault and no fault accidents, regardless of whether
the passenger contemplates a future suit against the driver. In
view of the Beschnett decision, the passenger is certainly not disthe insured [injured party] and to relieve the insured of the anxiety of

not knowing from what source the money to pay the bills is coming."
Jackson v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 41 Ill. App. 2d 300, 302, 190 N.E.2d 490,
492 (1963).
20. It has been suggested that an additional purpose of the coverage,
and adding to its widespread acceptance, was the "share-the-ride" policy
during rationing in World War II. See Note, 1955 WIs. L. REV. 483, n.6.
21. Compare Katz, op. cit. supra note 18, with APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra
note 18, and Ramsey, op. cit. supra note 18.
22. See generally Note, 34 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 495 (1966).
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suaded from pursuing a tort action and the prospect of again recovering the same medical expenses. It is unlikely that the insured contemplates such a result when he becomes a party to the
adhesion contract of insurance. The lower rate of insurance for a
policy which includes a set-off clause would seem preferable. In
addition, the set-off clause would provide certainty to the heretofore conflicting interpretations of the medical-payment provision.
Even without the set-off clause, it is submitted that the proper
judicial construction of the medical-payment provision should be to
deny a double recovery regardless of whether the action is in tort
against the insured or in contract against the insurer. Such a result would appear to fairly protect the rights of all the parties
involved. The injured passenger would receive full compensation
for his medical expenses. He would lose only his windfall. The
insured would get the maximum benefit from both the liability
and medical-payment coverages. When tort liability has been established he would get credit for any medical expenses previously
paid to the passenger. When the passenger chooses to sue the insured first and the insurer subsequently, a denial of recovery in
the second action would provide the insured with the benefit of
the medical payments coverage in the event the tort judgment is
larger than the limits of the liability coverage. Even assuming that
the insurer has calculated the double recovery in fixing the rates,
it is the insured who must bear the ultimate burden of higher
policy premiums. A denial of the double recovery should lead to a
reduction in the rates. Finally, it is suggested that the present
alignment of the courts in denying recovery against the insured,
but allowing it against the insurer, tends to defeat the primary
purpose of the medical coverage. The injured passenger is encouraged to waive the immediate relief from his medical expenses
in anticipation of a double recovery in the future. It is time to
reconsider the decisions and to revise the medical-payment coverage.
BARRETT S. HAIGHT

CRIMINAL LAW-CAUSATION-DIRECT
OR PROXIMATE?
Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 423 Pa. 67, 223 A.2d 291 (1966).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v.
Cheeks,' has raised a serious doubt as to the type of causal connection necessary to find a defendant guilty of murder. The court's
opinion presented the possibility that a finding that the defendant's
act was the "proximate cause" of the resulting death of the victim
would be sufficient to impose criminal guilt.
Cheeks, on the night of October 11, 1963, and in the company of
three other young men, assaulted and robbed Joe Henry Howell.
The victim walked five blocks to the home of his sister. After2
undressing, he remarked to his sister: "Those boys did cut me."
She then noticed that he was bleeding slightly from the abdomen.
At 2:10 A.M. the following morning, Howell was admitted to a
Philadelphia hospital, where an examination disclosed a penetrating wound in the area of the umbilicus. The extent of the wound
was not then ascertainable. An exploratory operation disclosed a
puncture of the abdominal cavity about one inch in length, and
that the only interior damage was to the mesentery, a leaf of tissue
which supplies blood to the organs in the area of the abdomen-a
relatively inconsequential injury. A "Levin" tube was inserted
through the nostril and into the stomach in order to eliminate
secretions and air resulting from a temporary paralysis of the
intestine, caused by the operation. Howell, in a "disorientated"
state, pulled out the Levin tube at least four times following the
operation. On October 15, the abdomen became markedly distended, and a larger "Cantor" tube was inserted to alleviate this
condition. Howell again pulled out this tube at least twice, the
second time occurring on October 18. As a result, a gag reaction
developed, causing a large amount of gastric material to be sucked
into the lungs. Howell expired the same day, due to suffocation.
Cheeks was tried and found guilty of first degree murder.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, stating
that the question of causation was properly given to the jury,
and that:
[T] he fact that the victim, while in a weakened physical
condition and disoriented mental state, pulled out the tubes
and created the immediate situation which resulted in his
death, is not such an intervening and independent act sufficient to break the chain of causation or events between
the stabbing and the death.'
1. 423 Pa. 67, 223 A.2d 291 (1966).
2. Id. at 70, 223 A.2d at 293.
3. Id. at 73-74, 223 A.2d at 294.
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The brevity of that part of the court's opinion which concerned
this issue, combined with the ambiguity of the language renders it
difficult to perceive exactly what type of causation the court was
ratifying as being necessary to determine guilt.
The cases cited by the court4 for the propositions that "the
fact that the stabbing was not the immediate cause of death is not
controlling," 5 and that "one charged with homicide cannot escape
liability merely because the blow he inflicted is not mortal, or the
immediate cause of death," are indicative of direct causation. Yet,
the use of the phrase "intervening and independent act" can be
interpreted to reflect proximate causation as being foremost in the
minds of the court. This contention is borne out by the dissent's
interpretation of the majority's opinion.7
If the test acknowledged by the court as being determinative
is that of direct causation, the only difficulty encountered in reconciling the Cheeks case with other similar recent Pennsylvania decisions,8 lies in the somewhat unusual factual situation presented in
Cheeks. The fact that the actual injury produced by defendant
Cheeks was relatively minor, combined with the number of other
acts which were necessary to produce the resulting death, produced
a complicated chain of events. Since the question of direct causation is properly a jury question in Pennsylvania, O and since the
Supreme Court apparently found that there was sufficient evidence
presented in the trial to enable a jury to reach the guilty verdict,
this difficulty may be overcome. Even the use of the words "intervening and independent act," often indicative of proximate rather
than direct causation, may be explained by the fact that no other
phrase lends itself so readily to defining an act which will relieve
the defendant of liability.
An argument could be made that the Cheeks court, in extending the doctrine of Commonwealth v. Root ' to meet the facts of
Cheeks, was merely submitting to the policy inherent in the felonymurder rule which would convict anyone who perpetrates one of
the five inately dangerous felonies (arson, burglary, kidnapping,
rape and robbery) of first degree murder where the victim later
dies. That this extension is warranted could be seen from another
4. Commonwealth ex rel. Peters v. Maroney, 415 Pa. 553, 204 A.2d
459 (1964); Commonwealth v. Williams, 304 Pa. 299, 156 A. 86 (1931); Commonwealth v. Eisenhower, 181 Pa. 470, 37 A. 521 (1897).
5. 423 Pa. at 73, 223 A.2d at 294.
6. Ibid.
7. 423 Pa. at 77, 223 A.2d at 296.
8. See Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961);
Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
9. Commonwealth ex rel. Peters v. Maroney, 415 Pa. 553, 204 A.2d
459 (1964); Commonwealth v. Smoker, 204 Pa. Super. 265, 203 A.2d 358
(1964); Commonwealth v. Harttle, 200 Pa. Super. 318, 188 A.2d 795 (1963);
Commonwealth v. Williams, 304 Pa. 299, 156 A. 86 (1931).
10. 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961).
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factual distinction between Root and Cheeks. Root merely involved the situation where the victim and the defendant were racing on the highway. The victim, in attempting to pass Root, struck
an oncoming truck and was killed. The element of wilful intent to
injure the victim was not present in Root, and the presence of this
element in Cheeks could account for the extension of the Root
doctrine in the present case.
A reasonable doubt remains, however. The dissent's statement
that Cheeks was a blatant violation of the principles expressed in
Commonwealth v. Root, implies rather strongly that the majority
relied on proximate causation for their decision. Root stated:
While precedent is to be found for application of the tort
law concept of 'proximate cause,' in fixing responsibility
for criminal homicide, the want of any rational basis for
its use in determining criminal liability can no longer be
properly disregarded."
The court in Root added: "The accused is not guilty unless his
conduct was a cause of death sufficiently direct as to meet the requirements of the criminal,and not the tort law."' 2
Root and its predecessor, Commonwealth v. Redline,13 thus
overruled a line of prior Pennsylvania cases which had utilized the
proximate cause test in determining criminal guilt. 14 While this
latter group of cases presented situations radically different from
that of the Cheeks case, the important factor is that Root discarded not the decisions of these earlier cases, but the concept of
utilizing proximate causation in criminal trials.
If the court in Cheeks did utilize the proximate cause test, then
another important consideration is raised. The question of causation was given to the jury. While it is proper to submit the issue
of direct causation to the jury, it was expressly stated in Commonwealth v. Bolish,'5 one of the cases which had used the proximate
cause test: "Whether the intervening act is legally sufficient to
break the chain and thereby relieve the original actor is a matter
of law for the Court."' 6 The Bolish court went on to state that it
11. Id. at 574, 170 A.2d at 311.
12. Id. at 575, 170 A.2d at 311.
13. 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
14. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955) (expressly overruled by Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472
(1958)); Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955) (reversed and remanded on grounds other than the use of the proximate cause
test; Bolish's conviction was again affirmed by the Supreme Court in 391
Pa. 550, 138 A.2d 447 (1958)); Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68
A.2d 595 (1949). Although other cases may be found which have been
cited as applying the proximate cause test, such as Commonwealth v. Moyer,
357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947), the above cases represent the ones most
often usrd as authority for the use of this test.
15. 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955).
16. Id. at 520, 113 A.2d at 475. (Emphasis added.)
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was both unnecessary and unwise to charge the jury on the complicated subject of proximate cause or the related issue of whether
certain acts are sufficient to break the causal chain. To do so, the
court felt, would be to permit the application by the jury of emotional subjectivity in an instance where the utmost objectivity is
not only highly desirable, but absolutely necessary. 17 If this was
what the court had in mind in Cheeks, it is a totally unwarranted
extension of the procedure of determining criminal guilt.
It should be noted that the Cheeks court made no mention of
either Root or of the prior line of cases which had accepted the
proximate cause test. Thus, the court gave no indication of whether
it was adhering to the Redline-Root line of decisions, or whether
it was regressing to a discarded basis of determining criminal guilt.
In view of the ambiguity manifested in Cheeks, the law of
Pennsylvania on this issue must exist in a state of confusion until
the court is again faced with this question. It can only be hoped
that the wisdom of Root will be followed, instead of the inequities
involved both in the use of proximate causation in criminal cases,
and in the submission of this nebulous concept to the jury.
JEFFREY C. MUNNELL

17.

Id. at 520-21, 113 A,2d at 475.

